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THE UNITED STATES, ISRAEL 
& UNLAWFUL COMBATANTS 
Curtis A. Bradley† 
HIS ESSAY CONSIDERS how members of a terrorist organi-
zation should be categorized under international law 
when the organization is engaged in an armed conflict 
with a nation. In particular, the essay discusses whether 
these members can properly be categorized as a type of “combatant” 
or whether they must instead always be categorized as “civilians.” 
The proper categorization can have significant implications for the 
nation’s authority under international law (and potentially also do-
mestic law) to subject members of a terrorist organization to mili-
tary targeting and detention. The United States and Israel currently 
have different legal approaches to the question, and the essay will 
explore and comment on these differences.1 
BACKGROUND 
he usual starting point for thinking about the proper categori-
zation of individuals involved in an armed conflict are the four 
Geneva Conventions that were negotiated shortly after World 
                                                                                                
† Curtis Bradley is the Richard A. Horvitz Professor at Duke Law School. A version of this 
paper was presented at the “From Ivy to Olives Academic Symposium” in Tel Aviv, Israel on 
June 1, 2009. 
1 I am assuming here, as have U.S. and Israeli courts, that an armed conflict can 
exist under certain circumstances between a nation and a non-state terrorist or-
ganization. See also, e.g., Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 1, 9 (2003). 
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War II. The Third Geneva Convention, which governs the treat-
ment of prisoners of war, and the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
which governs the treatment of civilians during wartime, are espe-
cially relevant. Both the United States and Israel ratified the Con-
ventions in the 1950s. There are also two Additional Protocols to 
the Conventions that were negotiated in the 1970s. Although nei-
ther the United States nor Israel is a party to the Protocols, some 
provisions in the Protocols may reflect customary international law 
that is binding on non-parties. 
According to many international law commentators, the Geneva 
Conventions allow for only two categories: lawful combatants, and 
civilians. Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention states that pris-
oner of war (POW) protections apply to both the armed forces of a 
party to the Convention, as well as to a party’s militia or other vol-
unteer corps if they meet four conditions: they must be “com-
manded by a person responsible for his subordinates”; have a “fixed 
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance”; carry their arms openly; 
and conduct their operations “in accordance with the laws and cus-
toms of war.” Those who argue that there are only two categories 
contend that anyone engaged in combat who does not qualify as a 
POW – in other words, anyone who is not a lawful combatant – is 
a civilian, and their treatment is regulated by the Fourth Geneva 
Convention.2 
Not surprisingly, the standards for military targeting and deten-
tion differ between the categories of lawful combatants and civil-
ians. For lawful combatants, a nation may target all members of the 
enemy’s armed forces (except medical and religious personnel), 
regardless of whether they happen to be participating in hostilities 
at the time of targeting. In addition, the nation may capture and 
detain all members of the armed forces until the end of hostilities, 
without any individualized showing of necessity. International law 
thus allows for a membership-based approach to the targeting and 
                                                                                                
2 See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 409-10 (2d ed. 2005); Knut 
Dormann, The Legal Situation of “Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants,” 85 INT’L REV. 
RED CROSS 45 (2003); Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 
103 AM. J. INT’L L. 48 (2009). 
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detention of lawful combatants. Civilians, by contrast, may be sub-
jected to military targeting only “for such time as they take a direct 
part in hostilities.”3 As for detention, civilians may be “interned” 
without trial “only if the security of the Detaining Power makes it 
absolutely necessary,” and the internee must be released “as soon as 
the reasons which necessitated his internment no longer exist.”4 
THE U.S. & ISRAELI APPROACHES 
oth the United States and Israel have had to confront the ques-
tion of how to categorize members of a terrorist organization, 
but their legal approaches have differed. After the September 11, 
2001 attacks, the United States categorized members of the Al 
Qaeda terrorist organization as “unlawful combatants,” and the 
United States claimed that this categorization meant (among other 
things) that members of the organization could be subjected to mili-
tary targeting and detention just like more traditional combatants, 
except that they were not entitled to the protections accorded to 
POWs under international law (such as immunity from prosecution 
for their combat activities). The United States thus contested the 
claim that anyone who does not qualify as a POW is automatically a 
civilian. According to the U.S. position, there are three categories 
in international humanitarian law rather than two: lawful combat-
ants, unlawful combatants, and civilians.5 
Despite imposing certain procedural restrictions on the govern-
ment, U.S. courts have so far accepted this three-category ap-
proach. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, for example, a plurality of the Su-
preme Court stated that “[t]he capture and detention of lawful 
                                                                                                
3 First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, art. 51(3).  
4 Fourth Geneva Convention, arts. 42, 132; see also id. at art. 78 (allowing occupy-
ing power to subject civilians to assigned residence or internment for “imperative 
reasons of security,” subject to a right of appeal and periodic review). 
5 Alternatively, but to the same effect, the U.S. position could be characterized as 
recognizing two general categories – combatants and civilians – and as classifying 
unlawful combatants as a sub-group of the first category. The key point is that the 
U.S. position treats unlawful combatants as distinguishable from both lawful 
combatants and civilians. 
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combatants and the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, 
by ‘universal agreement and practice,’ are ‘important incident[s] of 
war.’”6 This detention authority, the plurality further explained, 
lasts for “the duration of the relevant conflict.”7 Similarly, in Ham-
dan v. Rumsfeld, despite invalidating on statutory grounds the mili-
tary commission trial system that the Bush Administration had set 
up at Guantanamo, the Court made clear that it viewed the conflict 
between the United States and Al Qaeda as an “armed conflict” un-
der international law, and the Court said that “[the petitioner] does 
not challenge, and we do not today address, the Government’s 
power to detain him for the duration of active hostilities.”8  
In addition, although the Obama Administration has announced 
that it does not intend to use the term “enemy combatants” in de-
fending its military detention policy, this labeling change appears 
limited to domestic constitutional issues rather than international 
law issues, and the Administration has continued to claim the right 
under international law to treat members of Al Qaeda as combat-
ants rather than civilians. Thus, the Administration has argued that 
“Article 4 [of the Third Geneva Convention] does not purport to 
define all detainable persons in armed conflict” and instead simply 
“defines certain categories of persons entitled to prisoner-of-war 
treatment.”9 A contrary conclusion, the Administration has con-
tended, “would improperly reward an enemy that violates the laws 
of war by operating as a loose network and camouflaging its forces 
as civilians.”10 
                                                                                                
6 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality) (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28, 
30 (1942)). 
7 Id. at 526.  
8 548 U.S. 557, 635 (2006). 
9 Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority 
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay (March 13, 2009), at 8, In re 
Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation (D.D.C.), available at www.usdoj.gov/ 
opa/documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf. 
10 Id. For recent decisions accepting this argument, see Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. 
Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2009); Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 
2009). 
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By contrast, the Israeli Supreme Court has endorsed the two-
category approach. In its December 2006 decision in Public Commit-
tee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, the court considered 
the legality of Israel’s policy of targeted killing of members of ter-
rorist organizations involved in the planning, launching, or execu-
tion of terrorist attacks against Israel.11 In rejecting the Israeli gov-
ernment’s argument that the court should recognize an “unlawful 
combatant” category under international law, the court concluded 
that “the data before us are not sufficient to recognize this third 
category.” The court then proceeded to consider the circumstances 
under which civilians may be subjected to targeted killings. In its 
June 2008 decision in A. v. State of Israel, the court addressed the 
legality of Israel’s terrorist detention law, and it once again pur-
ported to apply a two-category approach.12 Although Israel’s deten-
tion statute specifically refers to “unlawful combatants,” the court 
concluded that, under international law, individuals falling into that 
classification are simply within a sub-group of the category of civil-
ians. The court then proceeded to consider the circumstances under 
which civilians may be detained. 
PROBLEMS WITH THE TWO-CATEGORY APPROACH 
lthough the two-category approach has substantial support 
among international law commentators, there are a number of 
reasons to question it. First, this approach may create perverse in-
centives. One of the central purposes of the laws of war is to en-
courage fighters both to distinguish themselves from civilians and to 
avoid attacking civilians. Under the two-category approach, how-
ever, a nation engaged in an armed conflict has less ability to target 
and detain fighters who fail to wear uniforms or who purposefully 
target civilians than if those fighters observe the principles of dis-
tinction. The two-category approach thus seems to reward the very 
                                                                                                
11 HCJ 769/02 (IsrSC 2006), available at elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/690/ 
007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf. 
12 CrimA 3261/08 (IsrSC 2008), available at elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/06/ 
590/066/n04/06066590.n04.pdf.  
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conduct that the laws of war are designed to prevent.13  
Second, the conception of “civilians” in the Geneva Conventions 
does not fit well with the reality of an armed conflict with a terror-
ist organization. While the Conventions envision that civilians 
might sometimes take part in hostilities, they envision that this 
combatancy is a temporary deviation for these individuals, and that 
there is some separate group of full-time fighters. For a terrorist 
organization engaged in an armed conflict with a nation, however, 
the involvement of the members of such an organization in hostili-
ties is not some temporary deviation from their normal circum-
stances. Thus, the time between terrorist attacks does not consti-
tute a reversion to non-combatancy – rather, that time is simply 
part of the planning and waiting associated with the terrorism itself. 
Nor is there any separate set of full-time fighters – the members of 
the terrorist organization are themselves the full-time fighters. 
Third, if members of a terrorist organization are considered to 
be civilians and thus immune from targeting except when directly 
participating in hostilities, it may be difficult to stop them from 
moving in and out of hostilities – the so-called “revolving door” 
problem.14 The members of a terrorist organization thus may “enjoy 
the best of both worlds – they can remain civilians most of the time 
and only endanger their protection as civilians while actually in the 
process of carrying out a terrorist act.”15 For example, the two-
                                                                                                
13 This problem would be exacerbated if, as the U.S. government and some com-
mentators have maintained, the four requirements in Article 4 of the Third Ge-
neva Convention apply even to regular armed forces. See, e.g., INGRID DETTER, 
THE LAW OF WAR 136-37 (2d ed. 2000); John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, The Status 
of Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 207, 225 (2003). If so, a nation that decided to 
stop having its regular armed forces wear uniforms would thereby make it harder 
under the two-category approach for those forces to be targeted and detained, 
turning the usual assumptions of international humanitarian law on their head. 
14 See, e.g., Richard D. Rosen, Targeting Enemy Forces in the War on Terror: Preserving 
Civilian Immunity, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 683, 738-41 (2009) (discussing this 
problem); W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 117-20 
(1990) (same). 
15 David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or 
Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171, 193 (2005). 
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category approach might mean that Al Qaeda military recruits train-
ing in Afghanistan could not be targeted because they are not lawful 
combatants and have not yet directly participated in hostilities. To 
take an even more extreme example, the two-category approach 
might mean that, after the September 11 attacks, the United States 
lacked the power to target Osama bin Laden, because he was no 
longer directly participating in hostilities.16 
Finally, the two-category approach threatens to undermine a na-
tion’s inherent right of self-defense. Both the UN Security Council 
and NATO appeared to recognize after the September 11 attacks 
that a nation’s right of self-defense can be triggered, at least in some 
instances, by terrorist attacks.17 But once the attack is over, the 
two-category approach seems to suggest that the attackers are no 
longer subject to a counter-attack because they are no longer di-
rectly participating in hostilities, thereby substantially reducing the 
value of the right of self-defense. As one commentator notes, under 
the two-category approach “the right of self-defence under Article 
51 of the UN Charter following an armed attack by a terrorist 
group may become meaningless.”18 
TEXT OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 
e might need to accept these problematic consequences if 
the two-category approach were mandated by the relevant 
text of the Geneva Conventions, but it is not. In the four original 
Geneva Conventions, the strongest textual argument for the two-
category approach comes from Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention. That Article states that those who find themselves in the 
hands of a party to an armed conflict or an occupying power are 
“protected persons” covered by the Fourth Geneva Convention 
(that is, civilians). It then carves out from its coverage persons cov-
ered by the other Geneva Conventions, including POWs. The nega-
                                                                                                
16 See R. J. Delahunty, Is the Geneva POW Convention “Quaint”?, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1635, 1654 (2007). 
17 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of Military 
Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 249, 257 (2002). 
18 Kretzmer, supra note 15, at 193. 
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tive implication, the argument goes, is that if someone does not fall 
within the protections of the other Conventions, they are covered 
by the Fourth Geneva Convention as a civilian. 
This textual argument does not work, however, in the context 
of a conflict against a terrorist organization, for two reasons. First, 
most of the Fourth Geneva Convention, including Article 4, applies 
only to armed conflicts between parties to the Convention and 
situations of military occupation in the territory of a party, and thus 
does not apply to a conflict between a party and a non-state terror-
ist organization. Second, Article 4 also carves out from its coverage 
individuals from states that have normal diplomatic relations with 
the detaining nation, something that will often be the case for 
members of a terrorist organization – it is generally the case, for 
example, in the conflict between the United States and Al Qaeda.19 
The textual argument is also undercut by Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions, which regulates “non-international” 
armed conflicts. The two-category approach would suggest that 
everyone who fights in a non-international armed conflict (such as a 
civil war) is a civilian, since the POW provisions in the Third Ge-
neva Convention apply only to conflicts between nations. Common 
Article 3, however, expressly envisions the detention of enemy 
armed forces: it states that its protections extend to persons, in-
cluding “members of armed forces,” who have been taken out of 
combat for any reason, including “detention.” State practice since 
the adoption of the Geneva Conventions also provides many in-
stances in which combatant detention frameworks have been used 
during non-international armed conflicts.20 Moreover, even the In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has recently ac-
knowledged that members of an organized armed group engaged in 
a non-international armed conflict can be considered combatants 
rather than civilians.21 
                                                                                                
19 Accord George H. Aldrich, The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal 
Combatants, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 891, 893 n.12 (2002). 
20 See Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and 
Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1086 (2008). 
21 See ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
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Provisions in the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Con-
ventions also appear to assume a third category. For example, Arti-
cle 75 refers to individuals “in the power of a Party to the conflict” 
who are not entitled to the protections of the Conventions, and 
Article 45 provides that “[a]ny person who has taken part in hostili-
ties, who is not entitled to prisoner-of-war status and who does not 
benefit from more favourable treatment in accordance with the 
Fourth Convention shall have the right at all times to the protection 
of Article 75 of this Protocol.” These provisions seem clearly to 
envision that there will be individuals who are neither lawful com-
batants nor civilians. 
STRETCHING THE CIVILIAN CATEGORY 
t least some of the problems associated with the two-category 
approach can be addressed by broadly interpreting the author-
ity of a state to target and detain civilians, and this is essentially the 
path taken by the Israeli Supreme Court. In the Public Committee 
Against Torture decision, the court broadly interpreted the circum-
stances under which a member of a terrorist organization should be 
viewed as directly participating in hostilities and thus subject to tar-
geting. Among other things, the court reasoned that this concept 
includes persons who plan and direct hostile actions as well as those 
who carry them out, and that those involved in ongoing terrorist 
activities are subject to targeting even during the time in between 
hostile acts. In the A. v. State of Israel decision, the court held that 
members of a terrorist organization can be subjected to administra-
tive detention even if they have not participated in hostilities, as 
long as they have “made a significant contribution to the cycle of 
hostilities in its broad sense.” Applied aggressively, these standards 
come close to treating active members of a terrorist organization as 
equivalent to enemy armed forces in a traditional armed conflict, 
without the benefit of POW protections – that is, they come close 
to what is allowed under the three-category approach. 
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While avoiding some of the anomalies discussed above, this 
stretching of the two-category approach has its own potential draw-
backs. In particular, it poses the danger of undermining the protec-
tions of true non-combatants in more traditional conflicts – by, for 
example, exposing to military attack civilians suspected of conspir-
ing with or giving support to the enemy. The protection of such 
non-combatants is one of the “cardinal principles” of modern inter-
national humanitarian law.22 If concepts such as “direct participa-
tion” are expanded to accommodate the unique features of an 
armed conflict with a terrorist organization, this protection may be 
eroded. 
This stretching is also likely to put the nation at odds with wide-
spread views among international lawyers about the scope of mili-
tary authority vis-à-vis civilians. Many commentators have a narrow 
view of concepts such as “direct participation in hostilities.”23 This 
leaves a nation like Israel vulnerable to significant legal criticism for 
its targeted killing and detention policies.24 Moreover, even after 
stretching the civilian category, a nation faced with an ongoing con-
flict with a terrorist organization may still find it necessary to devi-
ate from the two-category approach. Many commentators in fact 
accuse Israel of doing precisely that – for example, in connection 
with military operations against Hamas in Gaza.25 To take another 
example, it may be difficult to reconcile some of the U.S. Predator 
drone attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan (a practice continued by 
the Obama Administration) with the two-category approach, since 
                                                                                                
22 Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons ¶ 78 (ICJ July 8, 
1996), available at www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf. 
23 See, e.g., HELEN DUFFY, THE “WAR ON TERROR” AND THE FRAMEWORK OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 230 (2005) (“Direct participation should be narrowly con-
strued, and does not include for example support for, or affiliation to, the adver-
sary.”); Yael Stein, By Any Name Illegal and Immoral: Response to “Israel’s Policy of 
Targeted Killing”, 17 ETHICS & INT’L AFFAIRS J. 127, 129 (2003) (arguing that “as 
soon as [civilians] cease [engaging in hostilities] they regain protection”). 
24 See, e.g., Kristen E. Eichensehr, On Target? The Israeli Supreme Court and the Expan-
sion of Targeted Killings, 116 YALE L.J. 1873 (2007).  
25 See, e.g., David Luban, Was the Gaza Campaign Legal?, 31 ABA NAT’L SEC. LAW 
REPORT 2, 5-6 (Jan./Feb. 2009). 
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many of the targets are not participating in hostilities at the time 
they are attacked. 
One potential advantage of insisting on the two-category ap-
proach is that it seems to be more grounded in existing treaties – 
namely, the Geneva Conventions – and thus more respectful of in-
ternational law. It is at least debatable, however, which is more re-
spectful: stretching existing treaties in ways that many people find 
problematic, or acknowledging that the treaties have some limita-
tions and that a new framework needs to be developed. As noted 
below, if done in a way that builds upon the agreed-upon principles 
in the treaties, the three-category approach may do more to pro-
mote international law than the two-category approach. Moreover, 
by acknowledging that the existing categories of lawful combatants 
and civilians do not answer the hard questions, a nation is likely to 
expose itself to greater scrutiny, and thus potentially more account-
ability, than if it purports to be operating under preexisting rules. 
LEGAL BLACK HOLE? 
his takes us back to the three-category approach followed by 
the United States. This approach, too, is highly controversial. 
The biggest drawback to this approach is the possibility that it will 
result in a “legal black hole.” If members of a terrorist organization 
are neither POWs nor civilians, there is a danger that they might 
not have any legal protection at all. Some observers would cite 
abuses of terrorist detainees during the Bush Administration as con-
firmation of this danger. A related danger is that individuals with 
only tenuous connections to terrorism might be subject to targeting 
and detention; if so, this could itself seriously undermine the pro-
tection of civilians under international law. This overbreadth con-
cern was highlighted by the alarming suggestion of a U.S. govern-
ment lawyer in one case that even a “little old lady in Switzerland” 
who contributed money to a charity that turned out to support Al 
Qaeda could be held as a combatant.26 
                                                                                                
26 See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 475 (D.D.C. 2005), 
vacated sub nom. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev’d, 128 S. 
Ct. 2229 (2008). 
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As an initial matter, it is important to remember that the ma-
chinery for enforcing international law in this area is limited and 
highly dependent on domestic institutions. As a result, the danger 
of a legal black hole is likely to depend much more on the good faith 
of the nation involved, its sensitivity to international opinion, and 
its internal checks and balances than on the particular legal categori-
zations. Moreover, in a nation with a strong court system, which is 
true of both the United States and Israel, the government will likely 
need to sell its approach to the judiciary, and a legal black hole will 
not be acceptable to courts, something that became apparent during 
the Bush Administration. 
In any event, there is nothing inherent in the three-category ap-
proach that leads to a legal black hole or undue overbreadth. Today 
there is general agreement, for example, that the protections listed 
in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions apply in this con-
text, at least as a matter of customary international law. These pro-
tections would guarantee minimum standards of humane treatment, 
such as protection from torture and a requirement of basic due 
process for criminal prosecution. The U.S. Supreme Court has in 
fact held that Common Article 3 applies to the conflict between the 
United States and Al Qaeda.27 Many commentators also regard Ar-
ticle 75 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions 
(which contains a more extensive list of minimum protections) as 
reflecting customary international law. Some human rights treaties, 
such as the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, will also likely apply and 
provide protections.  
In addition, because a nation’s authority to target and detain ter-
rorists draws support from the international laws of war governing 
more traditional conflicts, the framework of those laws could be 
applied in a way that would impose genuine limitations. Thus, for 
example, in discerning who can be subjected to targeting and deten-
tion as unlawful combatants, an adjudicator might require as a pre-
requisite to combatant status that the individuals have attributes that 
                                                                                                
27 See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630-31. 
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make them functionally analogous to traditional armed forces. As 
Jack Goldsmith and I have argued, “terrorist organizations do have 
leadership and command structures, however diffuse, and persons 
who receive and execute orders within this command structure are 
analogous to combatants” in more traditional armed conflicts.28 
Such a “command structure” test would exclude “the little old lady 
in Switzerland” and other problematic examples from the combat-
ant category.29 Importantly, the ICRC has recently moved in this 
direction, suggesting that those members of an organized armed 
group who have a “continuous combat function” can be considered 
combatants rather than civilians.30 
Similarly, in discerning the appropriate length of detention, it 
may be appropriate to require a more individualized assessment of 
dangerousness than is required in more traditional armed conflicts. 
During a traditional conflict, enemy forces may be held until the 
end of active hostilities, and detention decisions are made on a 
class-wide basis. The operating assumptions are that detention is 
justified as a result of the danger that able-bodied enemy armed 
forces will return to the fight (perhaps even with the compulsion of 
their state), and that the detainees will be released once that danger 
has passed (due, for example, to a surrender by their government). 
In a conflict with a terrorist organization, however, detainees have 
no state obligation to return to hostilities if released, and their per-
sonal commitment to engage in such hostilities is likely to vary 
widely. Designation errors are also likely to be more common in 
this context, given the lack of uniforms and the lack of affiliation 
with an enemy state. Moreover, the conflict cannot be ended 
                                                                                                
28 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2114-15 (2005). 
29 See Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 68-69 (applying this test and concluding that 
“[s]ympathizers, propagandists, and financiers who have no involvement with this 
‘command structure,’ while perhaps members of the enemy organization in an 
abstract sense, cannot be considered part of the enemy’s ‘armed forces’ and 
therefore cannot be detained militarily unless they take a direct part in the hostili-
ties”). 
30 See ICRC, Interpretive Guidance, supra note 21, at 33-34. 
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through the defeat or surrender of a state and thus may last indefi-
nitely, perhaps even for the detainee’s lifetime. In this context, 
therefore, a regular, individualized assessment of the dangerousness 
of a detainee may be necessary.31 In other words, the assessment of 
whether hostilities are still ongoing would be made with respect to 
the particular detainee rather than on a class-wide basis. 
The U.S. government began moving towards such an individual-
ized perspective on the end of hostilities in 2004, with the estab-
lishment at Guantanamo of Administrative Review Boards, which 
make yearly assessments of whether the detainees continue to pose 
a threat.32 Through this process as well as other mechanisms, hun-
dreds of detainees have been repatriated or released from Guan-
tanamo, and an individualized assessment of the detainees is con-
tinuing under an Executive Order issued by President Obama.33 
The federal district court in D.C. recently made such an individual-
ized perspective even more mandatory.34 
Finally, it is analytically useful to separate the question of cate-
gorization from the question of process. To recognize a third cate-
gory does not tell us what process is required in order to determine 
whether someone falls into that category (or the institutions that 
should administer this process). In light of the higher risk of mis-
identification and the potentially longer duration of detention, there 
may be strong arguments for requiring substantially more process in 
an armed conflict with a terrorist organization than in a more tradi-
                                                                                                
31 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 28, at 2124-26; see also John B. Bellinger, III, 
“Prisoners in War: Contemporary Challenges to the Geneva Conventions” (Dec. 
10, 2007), at www.usembassy.org.uk/ukpapress72.html. 
32 See, e.g., Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, at www. 
defenselink.mil/news/Aug2006/d20060809ARBProceduresMemo.pdf. 
33 See Executive Order – Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities (Jan. 22, 2009), 
at www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ClosureOfGuantanamoDetentionFa-
cilities/. 
34 See Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.D.C. 2009) (ordering release 
of detainee based on evidence suggesting that “any ties with the enemy have been 
severed, and any realistic risk that he could rejoin the enemy has been fore-
closed”). 
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tional conflict.35 This emphasis on the need for sufficient process has 
in fact been the dominant theme of the U.S. Supreme Court’s deci-
sions in the area since the September 11 attacks. While process con-
siderations are most obviously relevant to detention decisions, addi-
tional process might also be warranted with respect to targeting 
decisions, at least after the fact. 
CONCLUSION 
lthough the two-category approach might seem at first glance 
to be the most protective approach for civil liberties, it is not 
clear that this is the case with respect to an armed conflict between 
a nation and a terrorist organization. If such a conflict is pushed into 
the civilian category, it is very likely that this category will be 
stretched in order to accommodate the security needs of the nation. 
The net result may be a reduction in protection for true non-
combatants. While the three-category approach is less anchored in 
existing treaties than the two-category approach, it allows for a 
more realistic description of how members of a terrorist organiza-
tion operate. Moreover, depending on how it is defined, the third 
category could contain significant substantive and procedural pro-





                                                                                                
35 See generally Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 28, at 2121-23; see also Matthew C. 
Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and Detention of Suspected 
Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (2008) (discussing standards of certainty to 
be applied to detention decisions). 
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